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Dollarization in Argentina
In January 1999, Argentine president
Carlos Saúl Menem announced his
intention of “dollarizing” Argentina’s
economy, i.e., adopting the U.S. dollar
as Argentina’s sole currency. His intent
is to protect the Argentine economy
from speculative attacks on its currency,
such as those observed in recent inter-
national financial crises. There are two
ways to implement dollarization. One
is for Argentina to proceed on its own;
the other is for Argentina to seek a for-
mal arrangement with the U.S. In this
article, we discuss the possible costs
and benefits of dollarization. We show
that, while it is feasible for Argentina to
act unilaterally, there are strong incen-
tives to seek a bilateral arrangement.
Some recent history
Argentina has a long history of high
inflation rates fueled by chronic fiscal
deficits. When Menem was elected
president in May 1989, the economy
was already sliding into hyperinflation.
In March 1991, the Congress passed
the “convertibility law,” establishing
the convertibility of the austral (the
Argentine currency since 1985) at a
rate of 10,000 australes per U.S. dollar.
In January 1992, the peso replaced the
austral (1 peso for 10,000 australes).
Under the convertibility law, the cen-
tral bank stands ready to sell dollars
at the rate of $1 per peso. Reserves,
consisting of gold and foreign curren-
cy or deposits and bonds payable in
gold and foreign currency, must be
maintained at a level no less than 100%
of the monetary base. Up to 33% of
reserves can be held in bonds of the
Argentine government. But, as of
April 7, 1999, 4% of reserves were
actually held in that form. Furthermore,
the central bank cannot change the
amount of these bonds by more than
10% in any given year.
The convertibility law
also forbids the central
bank from monetizing
government deficits.
Thus, the system cannot
be sustained in the long
term without sound fis-
cal discipline. This has
forced the government
to privatize many state-
owned companies and





of the banking industry,
with resulting benefits
to the economy.
For example, the average annual rate
of inflation, which reached a stagger-
ing 600% from 1983 to 1991, main-
tained a stable pace of 4.6% from 1992
to 1998 under the convertibility plan.
Figure 1 shows how after a long period
of stagnation, the growth rate of out-
put jumped from 0.4% in 1983–91 to
3.9% in 1992–98. The 1990s expan-
sion was interrupted only twice, coin-
ciding with the Mexican balance of
payments crisis (the “Tequila effect”)
in 1995 and the recent international
turmoil in 1998 (figure 1).
Although the Argentine peso has re-
mained pegged at $1 since 1991, cur-
rency crises elsewhere in the world
have prompted speculation on a pos-
sible devaluation of the peso, in spite
of limited trade links between the
affected countries and Argentina. For
example, Mexico’s share of Argentine
exports was only 1.7% in 1994, and
Argentina’s exports overall accounted
for just 9% of its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). Similarly, although Brazil
is Argentina’s main trading partner,
exports to Brazil represented only 3%
of Argentine GDP in 1998. Interest
rates rise sharply with each speculative
attack, as shown in figure 2. Further-
more, the premium in interest rates
on peso-denominated loans over dollar-
denominated loans rises as well, sug-
gesting that the perceived risk of
devaluation is much higher.
Two days after Brazil devalued the real
on January 13, 1999, it became known
that President Menem had asked his
finance minister to study dollariza-
tion. On January 22, the president of
Argentina’s central bank, Pedro Pou,
stated that a working group was to be
formed and meetings would take
place with U.S. officials over the com-
ing weeks to discuss ideas and possibly
work toward a treaty of monetary associ-
ation. Figure 3 shows the response of
markets to such news, indicating how
sensitive interest rates are to the per-
ception of a possible devaluation.
What does dollarization mean?
Dollarization means the elimination
of the Argentine currency, the peso,
and its complete replacement with
the U.S dollar. At present, the mone-
tary base in Argentina consists of the
peso-denominated currency. It would
1996 pesos per quarter
Source: Government of Argentina, Ministerio de Economía, 1999,
Informe Economico, No. 27, available on the Internet at www.mecon.ar/
informe/informe27/apendice.htm.
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15be converted into U.S. Federal Reserve
notes. The U.S. dollar would be the sole
legal tender and sole unit of account.
The Argentine economy is already
partly dollarized. For example, 60%
of private nonfinancial sector deposits
are in dollars. The reserve require-
ments of commercial banks are met
with dollar-denominated assets. Argen-
tines are already used to quoting prices
and carrying out transactions in dollars.
Complete dollarization would not
dramatically change their habits and
practices.
For Argentina to dollarize unilateral-
ly, the only requirement is to eliminate
the peso-denominated monetary base.
Since commercial banks presently
hold reserves in dollar-
denominated assets,
the monetary base is
just the currency in cir-
culation. To replace
the currency, Argentina
needs to buy dollars
and exchange all out-
standing peso notes
for dollar notes. Argen-
tina already has enough
resources to buy the re-
quired amount of dol-
lars. As of April 7, 1999,
the central bank held
$18.26 billion in re-
serves (excluding Ar-
gentine bonds), while
the monetary base was
$14.60 billion.
It is true that if Argentina adopts the
dollar as its national currency, it will
be unable to pursue an independent
or active monetary policy. But Argentina
has not had an independent monetary
policy since the passage of the convert-
ibility law in 1991. What the repeated
speculative attacks on the peso indi-
cate, however, is that retaining the op-
tion to resume an independent policy
has proven expensive for Argentina.
Another consequence of adopting the
dollar is that no Argentine institution
will be able to act as lender of last re-
sort to the banking sector by issuing
currency to financial institutions in
distress. Again, Argentina has not had




One is the use of the
foreign exchange re-
serves that the central
bank has accumulated
in excess of the require-
ments of the convert-
ibility law. Currently,
these stand at about
$3.6 billion, about 4%
of the banking sector’s
total deposits. The cen-
tral bank can lend these
excess reserves to illiq-
uid banks on a short-
term basis against
collateral. Another
mechanism is the imposition of re-
serve requirements on banks. Since
1995, banks can meet the requirement
with interest-bearing dollar-denomi-
nated assets held either in a foreign
bank account or at the central bank.
The central bank has total discretion
in setting the reserve requirements.
Currently, these reserves amount to
$16.8 billion, about 20% of deposits.
A third mechanism is a deposit insur-
ance fund, created in 1995, to which
banks must contribute on a risk-adjust-
ed basis; it is intended to reach the
level of 5% of deposits. Finally, Argen-
tina has arranged a contingent repo
facility with a consortium of private
foreign banks. This facility gives the
central bank the right to exercise a put
option on Argentine bonds for cash at
any time, subject to repurchase at the
end of the agreement period. The
facility amounts to $6.7 billion, about
8% of total deposits. These mecha-
nisms provide protection for nearly
40% of Argentina’s deposits, or more
than double the monetary base.
A cost–benefit analysis
The decision to dollarize can be taken
on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis.
The most obvious cost to Argentina is
the lost seigniorage on the peso, be-
cause once the peso is replaced by
the dollar, that seigniorage will accrue
to the United States. The benefit is
eliminating the consequences of
Tequila effects. (Since dollarization is
a one-time event that affects the whole
future of the Argentine economy, we
need to compare net present values,
which requires that some assumptions
be made about future growth rates of
certain variables).
The cost of unilateral dollarization for
Argentina stems mainly from the loss
of the foreign reserves that it would
have to sell in exchange for dollars.
These reserves bear interest, and
therefore are a source of income for
Argentina. This income is called
seigniorage, and comes from the
structure of any central bank’s bal-
ance sheet: Its liabilities (money)
bear no interest, while its assets do.
But once Argentina’s reserves are re-
placed by dollar bills, this source of
income disappears.
percent
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina, 1999, Boletín
Estadístico, available on the Internet at www.bcra.gov.ar/estadisticas/
eeyf0001.htm, April 14.
2. Interest rates on 30–60 day time deposits
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Notes: One-day peso and dollar loans. Time period covered is
January 4, 1999, to April 12, 1999.
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina, 1999, Boletín
Estadístico, available on the Internet at www.bcra.gov.ar/estadisticas/
eeyf0001.htm, April 14.
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How large would that loss be? Accord-
ing to the central bank’s income state-
ment, the income on all liquid reserves
in 1997 amounted to $781 million,
an average nominal rate of return of
4.7% (or 2.3% in real terms, given the
U.S. rate of inflation for that year).
Since liquid reserves were in excess
of the monetary base (which averaged
$14 billion in 1997), only $658 million
actually represents seigniorage, i.e.,
income on the reserves that back the
monetary base. Since nominal GDP
was $324 billion in that year, seignior-
age represented only 0.2% of GDP.
This number seems small, but it is
only a flow. Seigniorage is collected
every year. To calculate the costs for
Argentina of dollarizing, we compute
the value of all future seigniorage
that would accrue to the government
from the peso-denominated monetary
base if it did not dollarize. We estimate
what the monetary base would be in
the future and use a discount rate to
compute the net present value of
seigniorage under two alternative
scenarios. One is that the velocity of
circulation of money remains constant;
the other is that the monetary base
remains constant.
Using a nominal rate of return of 4.7%
on liquid reserves, a nominal discount
rate of 6%, an inflation rate of 2%,
and a long-run growth rate of real out-
put equal to 3% (roughly the U.S.
average to which Argentina may con-
verge), the first scenario leads to a
present value of seigniorage foregone
equal to $65.8 billion. In the second
scenario, the present value of the
seigniorage foregone is exactly the
current value of the monetary base,
about $14 billion, or 4% of GDP.
Which scenario is more appropriate
for Argentina? That is hard to say. In
other countries, the monetary base
usually grows at roughly the same rate
as nominal output. On the other hand,
Argentina’s monetary base stayed
roughly constant in nominal terms
from 1994 to 1998 and shrank by 20%
as a share of GDP, clearly as a result of
the Tequila effect.
What about benefits? As figure 1 shows,
the Argentine economy grew at a steady
8% annual rate from 1990:Q1 to
1994:Q4 and at the same rate from
1995:Q4 to 1998:Q2. The Tequila ef-
fect appears as a permanent shock to
the output level in 1995 that did not
affect growth rates before or after the
crises (had output continued to
grow without interruption, it would
now be higher than it is: The loss was
never recovered).
We think of Tequila effects as follows.
Every year, a Tequila shock might
occur, with some probability, indepen-
dently of previous occurrences. If the
shock occurs, output is lower than it
would have been in the absence of a
shock. Afterwards, growth resumes at
its normal rate, but output is perma-
nently lower than it would have been
without the shock. This model embod-
ies what we see in figure 1, namely,
that the growth rate was not perma-
nently affected by the Tequila effect,
but a sharp reduction in output oc-
curred in 1995.
For simplicity, we compare flows rather
than net present values, but the re-
sults are the same. If Argentina dollar-
izes, it loses seigniorage each year.
On the other hand, it avoids the pos-
sible output loss of a Tequila effect.
Unilateral dollarization will then be
advantageous if the expected output
loss exceeds the lost seigniorage.
One can think of giving up seignior-
age as the premium to insure against
possible output losses.
For the Tequila effect, the permanent
output loss turns out to be about 14%.
Current forecasts for GDP growth in
1999 suggest that the impact of the
Asian crisis will be the same size.
Using the numbers above, and under
the scenario that velocity will remain
constant, we find that the annual
probability of a Tequila effect would
have to be 1.4% to make Argentina
indifferent between dollarizing and
not dollarizing. Given that Argentina
has been hit twice in ten years, uni-
lateral dollarization is unambigu-
ously desirable.
While Argentina could substantially
benefit from a unilateral dollariza-
tion, there are incentives for Argenti-
na to seek an arrangement with the
U.S. That is because, in order to dollar-
ize, Argentina has to buy noninterest-
bearing dollars with the
interest-bearing reserves it holds; the
U.S. in effect swaps interest-bearing
debt for noninterest-bearing debt. Ac-
cording to our calculations above, this
represents a one-time transfer from
Argentina to the U.S. of about $65.8
billion under one scenario (constant
velocity) or $14 billion under the other
(constant monetary base). It is not sur-
prising that Argentina is seeking to
dollarize the economy within some
form of formal arrangement with the
U.S. that would allow it to reduce the
size of this transfer.
A formal arrangement might also be
of value to Argentina as a form of credi-
ble commitment. Since Argentina
could unilaterally reverse unilateral
dollarization by reintroducing a new
domestic currency and making it legal
tender, investors might remain wary of
the Argentine government’s future
actions and continue to demand high-
er interest rates to compensate for this
uncertainty. A formal, international
commitment to maintain the dollar as
the currency of Argentina could be
more persuasive.





















































































































































































































































Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Re-
serve Board’s Industrial Production Index for
the U.S. manufacturing sector. Autos and light
trucks are measured in annualized units, using
seasonal adjustments developed by the Board.
The purchasing managers’ survey data for the
Midwest are weighted averages of the seasonal-
ly adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing
Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) rose 0.3% from
February to March to a seasonally adjusted level of 129.8 (1992 = 100). The
Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial Production Index for manufacturing (IP)
was unchanged in March after having risen 0.3% the prior month. Light truck
production decreased from 6.9 million units in February to 6.6 million units in
March and car production increased slightly from 5.4 million units for February
to 5.5 million units for March.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index (a weighted average of the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee surveys) for production increased to 68.8% in
April from 59.2% in March. The purchasing managers’ indexes increased in
Chicago and Detroit, but decreased in Milwaukee. The national purchasing man-
agers’ survey for production decreased from 59.6% in March to 57.6% in April.
Motor vehicle production (millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Apr. Month  ago Year ago
MW 68.8 59.2 64.6
U.S. 57.6 59.6 53.4
Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Mar. Month  ago Year ago
Cars 5.5 5.4 5.4




Mar. Month  ago Year ago
CFMMI 129.8 129.4 127.9
IP 137.0 137.0 134.1





Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity